When reading What’s it’s like to be a bat by Thomas Nagel, I was confused more times than I can count. I was able to make sense of a few of his point but most of it didn’t make sense to me. Whenever Nagel tried to give an example of something he stated previously, that only left me more confused. I read paragraphs two, three times and I still was unable to connect the dots. Although Nagel’s essay was like trying to find directions to a place with the map upside down, I did manage to understand a few of his points (I think) and disagree with some also. (Due to my confusion of Nagel’s essay understand if my post seems unclear or doesn’t flow at some points.)
For starters, I have to say that Nagel doesn’t come off as if he knows everything and that is something I picked up on quickly. I suppose on a topic like neurology no person could come forward as if they know everything because everything is not even close to be discovered, but surely there is that one person who would; Nagel isn’t that person. When he doesn’t know something he clearly says that he doesn’t know. Whenever he brings up a counter belief that others have he doesn’t out right say that they are wrong; Nagel says, “there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism” (Nagel 1). He makes it known that he doesn’t agree with what they say, but doesn’t denounce their opinion.
An interesting point Nagel makes is that, “ Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless” (Nagel 1). If we were not conscious beings then we wouldn’t care about the mind-body problem. However, since we are that dilemma seems as if it is never ending.
I assume Nagel’s entire argument is basically that humans cannot understand what it is like to be a bat (or anything other than human) without actually experiencing it and since we cannot, we will never know what it is like. He does however make points that don’t add up to me. He says that if he was to behave like a bat he would only be able to see what it is like for him to be a bat. He wants to see what it is like for a bat to be a bat(Nagel 3). By saying this he is implying that he is an individual but bats are not individuals. All humans aren’t the same, “neurodiversity” they call it, but all bats are the same? That doesn’t make sense and to use his words against him, “ to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never… understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance” (Nagel 3). He makes it clear that he cannot understand what it is like to be a bat but he denies the possible reality of all bats having a different experience.
I agree, I was mostly lost except for a few moments of clarity. The whole article felt very repetitive and even at times condescending. The mind-body problem is a very complicated matter, with a lot of varying points of insights and not very much clarity which probably led to it being somewhat confusing. The points where Nagel was clear and articulated certain points were enlightening, I was left wanting more of those moments and less of the repetition of the “we know nothing/not enough” perspective.
I think most of us share your confusion. The opening paragraph where he says, “what makes the
mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.” because he assumes the people reading it KNOW these other problems so it’s going to click in their heads to say “oh yeah I get this” when really we don’t. I learned about the mind-body problem before so I understood certain things he was talking about but using terms that an everyday person who knows nothing about neurology, won’t understand. You are absolutely right to say we can’t know what it’s like to be anything other than ourselves because we would have to experience it. I believe this is why human relations are so complicated and there is always a lack of understanding when it comes to different people. We can only imagine what a dog or bat’s perspective will be like using our own human perspective. Maybe one day neuroscience will reach that far and we can get inside the consciousness of other people and other beings.
The way Nagel presents his proposal to us it does not seem right to me. I think he was losing us most of the parts while I was reading this because he keeps on mentioning one thing again and again. As a reader, I understand we can’t feel the same experience as a bat, neither bat’s will feel what humans feel. We are two different objects or a thing, but he mention bats are the one closer to the humans. But I don’t know how a bat feels or what their language is. I had so many questions as I was reading this, but I kept on reading to see if he will explain the questions that I have.
I also agree that this reading is a bit complex. Throughout this entire article, he talks about subjective character. Which confused me a bit because I wasn’t sure what a subjective character is.Natasha, i agree with your assumption, I guess no matter how hard we try, we still wouldn’t know what it’s like to a bat. On the other hand, a bat is of a different species than we are.
Natasha, you pointed out something that I didn’t really notice before. In a strange way, Nagel doesn’t necessarily sound like he knows what he is talking about. It is partially because we do not fully understand the topic but it also seems that his thoughts are sometimes scattered. I think that for articles of this nature, on a topic as complex as neurology it is important to have some type of prior knowledge. The way Nagel words his arguments, it’s safe to say that he does make many assumptions that his readers have some type of prior knowledge which makes it ten times more difficult. Safe to say we all feel the same! Great post!
Yes, I was definitely confused by this essay too. As conscious beings, we have the ability to consider abstract concepts, such as how it would feel to be a bat. However, Nagel seems to be arguing that the experience isn’t really complete unless we experience being a bat as a bat experiences being a bat. Does this indicate that the bat itself needs to be conscious of its bathood (if you will) in order for us to imagine being a bat firsthand and experience this bathood? I also noted in the same way you did that Nagel shunted the responsibility of proving the validity of his claims away from himself, but in no particular direction, leaving unanswered the question that he himself proposed.